Transforming Credit Risk Management - Validating Calibration
SummaryExisting credit risk measurement techniques measure credit risks on a relative scale. The Basel II Accord attempts to transform relative risk measures into absolute risk measures. To support the transformation process, the Accord has identified four drivers of credit risk: exposure, probability of default, loss given default, and maturity. The Accord has not yet fully recognized correlations among these four drivers. This series of articles from i-flex Consulting provides a measurement framework for these drivers for different products, counterparties, portfolio, industries, instruments, etc. Most banks presently recognize only probability of default at various levels of sophistication as the risk driver. In order to measure absolute credit risks, the measurement process requires transformation at three levels. It:
The eight articles in this series together describe the transformation of credit risk measurement at these three levels. The series aims to provide a framework to support transformation process by extracting methodologies, best practices, architecture and bench mark risk measures from the Accord, papers, studies, surveys published by BIS, and literature published by academics and banks to support or criticize the Accord. Articles in this series
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Validation is a process to validate risk indicators’ calibration with risk drivers. Risk drivers must be calibrated with credit losses and actual measures need to be validated against estimated measures. The ultimate purpose is to validate credit losses measures. The validation process attempts to prove consistency and accuracy of measurements. Consistent validation can be across a time period or across the calibration to credit losses. Furthermore, the Basel Accord recommends that testing and validation methods should not systematically vary over the economic cycle.
The following table indicates validating accuracy and reliability of PD (probabiliuty of default):
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Calibration Errors |
Do the central default probabilities (or expected loss levels) correspond to each grade adequately established? |
Compare expected and actual default/loss rates. |
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Rating errors |
Are assets graded consistently with their inherent loss characteristics? |
Compare the ratings awarded to the same company or set of companies by a variety of institutions, including rating agencies. |
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Granularity errors |
Does the number of gradings allow sufficient differentiation of the exposures in a portfolio? |
Break down exposures by bucket on the rating scale. |
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Rating stability |
Is the proportional relationship between the average EDFs that define rating categories consistent throughout the cycle, both overall and within market segments? |
Review the stability of ratings throughout the economic cycle or during economic shocks. |
Validation approaches differ for portfolios and usually follow the ‘bottom-up’ approach.
In a study released in April 1999, the Committee concluded that it was premature to consider the use of credit risk models for regulatory capital, primarily because of difficulties in calibrating and validating these models. Back-testing bank risk systems has been a key component of regulatory approaches to internal models since banks were first permitted to use internal models for calculating regulatory capital for market risks in the trading book in the 1996 amendment to the Capital Accord (implemented from 1998). Some of the validation methodologies are:
This is similar to the back-testing concept for market risk (VaR) validation. It typically amounts to calculating observed default rates/loss rates in each rating category over a sufficient period of time and verifying the existence of a strong relationship between internal ratings and default/loss rates. Actual default/loss rates can then be compared to those assumed or predicted by the rating model. The main difficulty posed by this method is the need for a large series of internal ratings and default or loss events. Banks, therefore, adopt other methodologies too.
The purpose of scenario analysis is to identify the financial impact of low probability, but iincludes plausible events that may not be captured by a statistically based model. Therefore, the use of a credit risk model should be supplemented by stress-testing the assumptions used.
This is an efficient way of approaching the validation of internal ratings for publicly traded companies. It involves contrasting the output of an internal rating system against estimations of default/migration probabilities or losses obtained using other rating sources. Benchmarking is required against the following:
The (ex-ante) probability of default should not be significantly different from the (ex-post) realized default frequency. Some of the thumb rules to validate credit rating systems are:
One of the tests likely to be insisted by supervisors may be 30 – 60 per cent change in the PD. This change is equivalent to one or two notches downgrading of borrowers. It was found that this increases mean capital requirement by about eigth per cent to 15 per cent (0.64 – 1.2 per cent additional capital) of the capital required (of eigth per cent).
Multivariate stress tests are now becoming a reality. Until recently, stress tests considered only a single risk factor change. This implicitly means null correlation between the risk factors. In reality, however, simultaneous changes in the risk factors are observed. Univariate stress tests should therefore be supplemented by multivariate stress tests in which more than one risk factor is changed at a time. (For example, a multivariate stress test was conducted by a regulator in Germany for its banking industry.)
| Validation Practice | Best Practice | Likely role of NS |
|---|---|---|
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Compare actual return performance |
Actual performance is within the expected range of predicted results. |
NS are likely to prescribe the percentage variation allowed in EL or volatility. |
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Use of quantitative validation tools |
Use of external data. Use of appropriate data on long data histories, covering a range of economic conditions, and ideally one or more complete business cycles. Data to be updated regularly. Consistent use of data and models. Changes in assumptions, models and data require appropriate actions. Out of time and out of sample performance tests. Make use of historical data for as long as possible. |
NS may prescribe the frequency of updates. It may also start pooling data and supply such data for validations. Or may encourage validations against some named source. It may also prescribe some of the assumptions to be considered or not to be considered. |
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Validations aimed at reduction in the gap of ex-ante and ex-post |
Testing methods and other validation methods do not vary systematically with the economic cycle. These standards must take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in default experiences. |
May prescribe the requirements for standards or assumptions for the business cycle. |
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Back-testing |
Banks are encouraged to compare their realized risk dimensions measurement with published by the Basel Accord (for LGD and EAD). |
NS may publish their measurements for various risk dimensions periodically. |
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Calibrating proxies to risk |
Proxies should be adequate for measuring the risks. Derived using historical and market conditions. Estimates the underlying risks. Banks should add sufficient margin of conservatism. |
Rigorous statistical methods for validation. |
Minimum standards for a model:
Retail exposure, being more granular and possessing homogeneity, will have a lower loss volatility and the loss curve will be nearer to a normal distribution. Therefore, the shape of the curve is characterized by two statistics – mean and standard deviation of loss rates. However, it should be noted that curves built on the basis of past data are generally not a good fit because of:
Therefore the following steps need to be taken to build a good fit curve:
Implicit in the assumption is that the retail assets are more diversified and, therefore, less correlated with the overall economy than the corporate portfolio. However, geographic concentration remains. There are no explicit adjustments for maturity in the retail mortgage portfolio. Going forward, both these adjustments may be made by banks in their models. Credit risk based on one-year default rates does not reflect credit risk on mortgages.
Interest rate risks and the choice of options though is outside the discussion of this paper but has definite impact on mortgage lending type assets. Banks are expected to implement systems designed to validate ratings and bank supervisors will check the efficiency of those validation systems.