Five Emerging Trends in Risk Management
Key areas of change in risk management practices shall naturally derive from the ongoing analyses of the crisis and its roots. Risks, such as market or credit, do not change in nature but evolve with the instruments and purposes they are used for. The way we manage those risks, however, will be entirely different in the near future.
All types of risk exposure – market, credit, legal – are interrelated to each other. Liquidity is the ultimate reward or punishment for the sound management of the other risks combined. Therefore, liquidity risk emerges as the ultimate operational risk across departments, firms, sectors and even across borders by the regulators themselves.
We have identified five areas of change that will elevate risk policies to strategic priority, executed as a corporate culture hinging on risk management techniques, dynamically implemented throughout the enterprise.
As previously stated, the management of all risks and the adequacy of the perceived risk appetite of the firm will be sanctioned with the abundance of business and liquidity. Failure, on the other hand, has immediate impact that can lead to bankruptcy. For example, the exposure to counterparty risk was traditionally measured as the outstanding amount plus or minus a profit or loss. Settlement risk was a replacement cost plus a profit/loss. But the credit crunch raised the stakes, so that a customer’s settlement failure is now perceived as exposure to clients with solvability issues, or as the bank’s failure to properly value collateral, call margins and mitigate risks. As a result, a bank’s own credit spread may rise, which may have an impact on its equity value and funding costs.
Liquidity issues seem to derive from the mishandling of risks related to the financial and technical aspects of the trading and banking business, such as funding, portfolio and collateral management, counterparty management, failed settlements, and other operational issues. Therefore, liquidity risk should be considered the ultimate operational risk rather than a stand-alone risk. There are three main causes of liquidity risk:
Mitigating liquidity risk should consist not only of preparing liquidity buffers as a counterbalance, but also requires a fundamental review of risk factors and their alignment with the risk policy of a firm. This is not straight forward as the risk factors a firm is exposed to may not be immediately visible, especially where securitisation and derivatives are involved. It may be necessary for a firm to map all the assets or risk factors underlying the assets under management to fully understand risk exposure and potential concentrations. An in-depth review of actual risk factors, including links with the firm’s main customers, sensitivity and concentrations of key assets to those factors and potential correlations among assets, clients and portfolios, are all fundamental to defining the appropriate stress scenarios of each firm. Each firm must engineer its own individual response and counterbalancing framework in the context of its own exposure, exposure of its clients, and the nature of the business, and then align it with the approved risk policy.
The appropriate prevention and management of liquidity problems should involve a tight monitoring of concentrations. Banks are traditionally structured to monitor and hedge concentrations within their lending books, thus focusing on funding risk. Buy-side firms are normally required and equipped to monitor and diversify their concentrations within portfolios, so preventing market liquidity risk.
Challenges arise when both the buy-side and sell-side need to tackle cross-asset concentrations to similar risks, when the concentrations are hidden by the derivative nature of the instruments, when funding can be disrupted as a result on market movements changing the value of collateral and when all are impacted by their counterparties’ failure to properly handle those risks. It would be difficult to predict all business scenarios that can result in unbalance and disruptions of this sort as they tend to result from unexpected correlation and volatility movements due to unforeseen events. It is possible, however, to tightly monitor exposure concentrations of all kinds, internal and external, as they point out the vulnerabilities of a firm (internal) and even the ones of the entire industry and financial markets (external).
Wealth generating markets, such as stock exchanges or real estate, aggregate liquidity based on the perceived value of the assets traded. Zero-sum game markets, such as futures and options, match customers so that the gain of a trader gain is the loss of another. One macroeconomic role of the former is to absorb or regurgitate liquidity, the latter is a hedging tool for operators with matching exposures to risk factors, such as fluctuations of commodity or currency prices, for example.
A key element to maintaining wealth-generating markets in balance is the different timeframes in which investors operate. What one perceives as a short-term opportunity to sell an asset is seen as a long-term investment by others. The exposure derived from the various investments lead to hedging with zero-sum game markets such as futures and options. Hedges are always arranged for the short term, or rolling from tenant to tenant, due to the risk profiles and settlements they require. Zero-sum markets do not drive trends but can dramatically amplify the short-term price fluctuations of the underlying investments they are derived from.
Speculative bubbles tend to inflate when a large majority of investors trade in a single direction regardless of a timeframe. Risk concentrations form at that point and are particularly likely to trigger liquidity problems as everyone becomes a short-term trader and may exit in panic when the bubble bursts. A definition of a stock market crash is ‘the day everyone becomes a short-term trader’. While it would not be possible to predict where and when the next bubble will be created, there are tools to help monitoring risk concentrations build-up and the liquidity risk associated.
The key to understanding a firm’s vulnerabilities is to uncover the actual risk factors it is exposed to. For example, a firm holding a portfolio of securities exposed (directly or indirectly) to commodity prices would get only a partial view of its risk exposure by running simulations on equity prices only. The potential impact of the underlying commodities on the equities also has an effect. Simulating prices of the underlying equities is also fraught as it relies on many assumptions such as the covariance of the equity versus underlying price returns, the impact on the market volatility and liquidity of extreme market movements, correlations within the industry and so on. In other words, considering the impact of liquidity risk requires monitoring risk exposures at their roots, as much as possible. Each firm should therefore embark in identifying all root-risk factors, monitor the concentrations they build-up and add radical correlation changes in their scenarios.
Price movement and volumes traded give precious indications of potential concentration build-ups as they point out the degree of emotion in which securities or financial instrument are traded. A well-balanced market where buyers meet sellers in steady volume tends to return normally distributed prices and P/L changes, on both short- and medium-term. Before a market loses balances and experiences a massive drawdown, some typical distortions are often noticeable, such as directional volumes imbalance, unexpected changes in correlations, unusual standard deviations, and so on.
Simultaneously, news releases relating to such markets tend to accelerate, new sources of information appear, the market sentiment tends to point to a single direction. The market liquidity may actually be at its highest at such point, but the market gets vulnerable.
The impact of volatility and correlations on market liquidity is massive and complex. The unpredictable nature of correlations under stressed conditions makes models less reliable. The interaction of volatility, liquidity and correlation is three-dimensional and non-linear. Simulations based on history can be misleading, too, since financial markets typically suffer from remedies or structures derived from a previous crisis so the next crisis will necessarily be different from previous ones.
It is possible, however, for analysts to keep tracking the effects that liquidity (expressed in market depth), volatility (implied) and correlation have on each other and relate those observations to news as it breaks on a real-time basis. For example, one can define several categories of news related to oil prices, set up systems for machine-readable news to automatically trigger records of price changes, volatility, impact on correlations, on credit, credit correlation and so on. It sets the base for an exploratory forward-looking approach that can supplement a quantitative statistic-based analysis.
As the sound management of such sensitivities and the capacity of risk managers to pre-empt the risk will be eventually rewarded or punished with liquidity implications, we can conclude that the most important aspect of new risk management is transparency. Not only the transparency of pricing models, but also the clarity of processes, counterparty relationships, connectivity and IT set up, regulatory compliance and the adequacy of the overall framework with the shareholders’ appetite for risk.