Credit Valuation Adjustment: Opportunity to Enhance Credit Risk Management and Pricing
Imagine you’re a bank that has been active in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market for the past decade. Although your exposure to counterparty credit risk is real, the management of exposure has been a secondary consideration to revenue growth. The International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) observed that the notional amount outstanding in the OTC derivatives market grew seven-fold between 2000 and the end of June 2008, when the total amount reached US$637.7 trillion. At the time, this figure may have seemed like just another milestone on a chart moving endlessly upwards.
Yet by the end of December 2008, the total notional amount of OTC derivatives contracts outstanding was US$592 trillion. This was the first decline since the collection of data began in 1998. This transition from expansion to contraction, along with the uncertainty in global markets, would have likely led you to re-examine how you price credit risk in order to make better use of available capital.
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) provides just such an opportunity. While the traditional means for banks to control credit risk has been setting limits on credit exposure and then checking that potential trades do not exceed set limits, CVA enables banks to price counterparty credit risk directly into trades, fully accounting for the cost of carrying or hedging the risk. Institutions wishing to implement CVA might naturally seek to incorporate it into their existing systems. However, many current trading systems cannot be easily extended for CVA. It therefore becomes important to understand how CVA fits into the bank’s methodology and to ensure it is being calculated by an appropriate system. When these two conditions are met, CVA will allow banks to free up capital, enable hedging strategies and minimise the volatility of earnings, thus facilitating future growth.
For years, standard industry practice was to mark derivative portfolios to market without taking the counterparty credit into account. All cash flows were discounted by the LIBOR curve, regardless of whether the trading counterparty was AA or BB. However, the true portfolio value must incorporate the possibility of losses due to counterparty default. In the case of a corporate bond, this is captured by discounting the cash flows on a spread above the risk-free rate, where the spread is a function of the creditworthiness of the issuer. CVA is, by definition, the difference between the risk-free derivative portfolio value and the true portfolio that takes into account the possibility of counterparty default. This adjustment can be positive or negative depending on which of the two counterparties (your own bank or the counterparty) is most likely to default and the in-the-moneyness of the portfolio.
The international accounting standard SFAS 157 requires banks to report the value of their derivative portfolio net of the credit valuation adjustment. In spite of credit mitigants in the form of netting and collateral, the CVA adjustments can be extremely large and changes in CVA from one reporting period to the next can have a material impact on overall profit and loss. For example:
Citigroup, Q1 2009 – A net income of US$1.6bn was recorded. This net income included a US$2.7bn credit valuation adjustment gain resulting primarily from the widening of Citigroup’s credit default swap spreads relative to counterparties.
AIG, Q4 2008 – As AIG received bailout funds from the Federal Reserve, credit spreads on the corporation narrowed, causing additional huge losses. AIG reported a US$6.7bn pre-tax (US$4.4bn after-tax) charge related to AIGFP’s credit valuation adjustment for mark-to-market (MtM) adjustments. This charge was a result of an increase in counterparty spreads and a decrease in AIG’s own credit spread, causing fair value losses on both AIGFP’s assets and liabilities.
The consistent and systematic application of counterparty-level CVA allows financial institutions to incorporate the pricing of credit risk into the pricing of derivative transactions, thereby leading to a more comprehensive pricing and capital management approach.
Such CVA adjustments will allow financial institutions to:
The credit exposure at the counterparty level is not the simple sum of trade level exposures due to portfolio diversification, netting and collateral agreements. In fact, it is generally much less than the simple sum. For this same reason, counterparty-level CVA, which must consider all the trades with a counterparty and uses risk-neutral scenarios for position valuation and pricing, can be very different from the sum of individual deal CVA and is generally considerably less than the sum of trade level CVAs. This comparison is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
CVA can be calculated analytically for certain product types. In a unilateral case, the CVA adjustment is calculated assuming that the counterparty might default but that your own bank will never default. In the bilateral case, both counterparties might default. For the purposes of this overview, our examples will assume the unilateral case. For example, the CVA for a swap is closely related to the value of a swaption on the underlying exposure, which consequently increases the convexity of the interest rate exposure and impacts VaR (see Figures 2 and 3 above). But while CVA can be calculated analytically for certain product types, Monte Carlo simulation is the only practical alternative to measure counterparty-level CVA for real world multi-asset portfolios, as these simulations include netting and collateral agreements that span product and risk factor silos.
Conceptually, CVA modeling is a straightforward extension of the Monte Carlo-based simulation models used to estimate potential future exposure. This is illustrated in Figure 4 below. The valuation models used in step 2 and all the models used to incorporate the impact of netting and collateral in steps 3 to 6 are common. Exposure and CVA models also share common data inputs – market data, and terms and conditions for all trades and netting agreements, including credit support annex details, such as thresholds, call frequency and minimum transfer amounts.
Once the discounted exposure profile has been obtained, the calculation of CVA involves multiplying the discounted expected exposure in each time step by the risk-neutral probabilities of default and loss given default in that time step, and summing across all time steps over the life of the portfolio.
As financial institutions explore the feasibility of extending current simulation-based exposure models to calculate CVA, care must be taken to ensure that the straightforward conceptual extension is in fact a straightforward practical extension. These considerations help illustrate why many existing counterparty credit risk systems can’t be easily extended for CVA. Some of the more important factors include:
Another potential starting point for CVA measurement is a front-office system. This is usually a non-starter, for many of the same reasons that they are not used for exposure simulation. Front-office systems are designed to value trades at the trade level. Therefore, any concept of producing counterparty-level exposures for real world portfolios where some positions net, some don’t, and some are subject to collateral agreements and others are not throws them off completely. And yet staying at the trade level is not an option to accurately manage CVA. In addition to the considerations outlined above, front-office systems present other barriers to CVA measurement, including an inability to simulate through time, performance limitations, and the fact any single trading system is not typically used for all the trades with a given counterparty.
While it may seem natural or even desirable to extend existing trading systems to calculate CVA, there are sufficient barriers in place that make this scenario unworkable. These systems do not have the ability to model netting and collateral agreements, generate the required risk-neutral scenarios across all risk factors, the performance levels required to complete CVA calculations and often process only a subset of all the trades with a counterparty. As a result, existing trading systems will most likely be a poor starting point to provide credible CVA measurement.
In fact, the requirements for CVA are better met by risk systems than their trading or front-office equivalents. A properly-engineered counterparty credit risk system that combines the pre-deal checks, precision and 24/7 operability of front-office systems with the performance and scenario-driven methodologies found in risk systems can be easily extended to CVA.
Banks should continue to investigate and implement approaches to enhance the pricing and measurement of credit risk. Through its ability to reduce P/L volatility, enable hedging strategies and create greater credit capacity, CVA, with the proper risk system in place to support it, provides just such an opportunity.